Dynamic criticality management in surveillance applications with wireless sensor networks

RSAC2011
Oran, Algeria
June 22nd, 2011

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Gestion dynamique de la criticité dans les applications de surveillance avec des réseaux de capteurs sans-fils

Journées RSAC2011
Oran, Algérie
Mercredi 22 juin, 2011

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



Projet PHC Tassili

Contrôle coopératif dans les réseaux de capteurs sans fil pour la surveillance

Thèses en co-tutelles

Séjours seniors, juniors

Evénements, journées thématiques: RESSACS'10, RESSACS'11, RSACS'11

Laboratoire RIIR



MIDDLEWARE/APP. ISSUES WE ADDRESS
ENERGY CONSIDERATIONS
NETWORK
SIGNAL IMAGE/VIDEO PROCESSING
OS MIDDLEWARE SOFT. ENG.
DATA MNGT
HARDWARE RADIO
SENSOR'S OS
SUPERVISION PLATFORM
APPLICATIONS
CBSE for SENSOR NODE
DYNAMIC RECONFIGURATION
SERVICE-ORIENTED
SERVICE REPOSITORY
ADAPTIVE APPLICATION
QOS



NETWORK ISSUES WE ADDRESS
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ORGANIZATION OVERLAYS
TRANSPORT
ROUTING
MAC RESOURCES ALLOCATION
VIDEO COVERAGE SELECTION & WAKE-UP MECHANISM
LOAD-REPARTITION CONGESTION CONTROL
MULTI-PATHS ROUTING
QOS

Wireless Sensor Network







Wireless Video Sensors (1)

Imote2



Multimedia board



Wireless Video Sensors (2)



Surveillance scenario (1)

- Randomly deployed video sensors
- Not only barrier coverage but general intrusion detection
- Most of the time, network in so-called *hibernate mode*
- Most of active sensor nodes in *idle mode* with low capture speed
- Sentry nodes with higher capture speed to quickly detect intrusions

● Sentry node: node with high speed capture (high cover set).

○ Idle node: node with low speed capture.



Surveillance scenario (2)

- Nodes detecting intrusion must alert the rest of the network
- 1-hop to k-hop alert
- Network in so-called *alerted mode*
- Capture speed must be increased
- Ressources should be focused on making tracking of intruders easier



Surveillance scenario (3)

- Network should go back to *hibernate mode*
- Nodes on the intrusion path must keep a high capture speed
- Sentry nodes with higher capture speed to quickly detect intrusions



Node's cover set

- Each node v has a Field of View, FoV_v
- $Co_i(v)$ = set of nodes v' such as $\bigcup_{v' \in Co_i(v)} FoV_{v'}$ covers FoV_v
- Co(v)= set of $Co_i(v)$



$Co(v)=\{V_1,V_2,V_3,V_4\}$

Criticality and risk-based scheduling

Basic approach: PM2HW2N/ACM MSWIN 2009
Current approach: IEEE WCNC2010
With intrusion detection results: IEEE RIVF2010
With re-inforcement: IEEE ICDCN2011
Journal paper in JNCA, Elsevier

Don't miss important events!

Whole understanding of the scene is wrong!!!

What is captured

How to meet surveillance app's criticality

- Capture speed can be a « quality » parameter
- Capture speed for node v should depend on the app's criticality and on the level of redundancy for node v
- V's capture speed can increase when as v has more nodes covering its own FoV - cover set

Criticality model (1)

- Link the capture rate to the size of the cover set
- High criticality
  - Convex shape
  - Most projections of X are close to the max capture speed
- Low criticality
  - Concave shape
  - Most projections of X are close to the min capture speed
- Concave and convex shapes automatically define sentry nodes in the network



Criticality model (2)

- R^0 can vary in [0,1]
- Behavior functions (BV) defines the capture speed according to R^0
- $R^0 < 0.5$
  - Concave shape BV
- $R^0 > 0.5$
  - Convex shape BV
- We propose to use Bezier curves to model BV functions



Behavior function

$$B(t) = (1-t)^2 * P_0 + 2t(1-t) * P_1 + t^2 * P_2$$



Some typical capture speed

- Maximum capture speed is 6fps or 12fps
- Nodes with size of cover set greater than N capture at the maximum speed

N=6
$P_2(6,6)$

r^0 \ $\|Co(v)\|$	1	2	3	4	5	6
0.0	0.05	0.20	0.51	1.07	2.10	6.00
0.2	0.30	0.73	1.34	2.20	3.52	6.00
0.5	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	6.00
0.8	2.48	3.80	4.66	5.27	5.70	6.00
1.0	3.90	4.93	5.49	5.80	5.95	6.00

N=12
$P_2(12,3)$

r^0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
0	.01	.02	.05	0.1	.17	.26	.38	.54	.75	1.1	1.5	3
.2	.07	.15	.25	.37	.51	.67	.86	1.1	1.4	1.7	2.2	3
.4	.17	.35	.55	.75	.97	1.2	1.4	1.7	2.0	2.3	2.6	3
.6	.36	.69	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.8	2.0	2.2	2.4	2.6	2.8	3
.8	.75	1.2	1.6	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.9	3
1	1.5	1.9	2.2	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.9	2	3

Finding v's cover set

Basic approach: IFIP WD2009
Improved version: IEEE WIMOB 2010
With adaptive scheduling: IEEE ICUMT 2009



2α=AoV

AoV=20°



AoV=38°



AoV=31°

P = {v ∈ N(v) : v covers the point "p" of the FoV}
B = {v ∈ N(v) : v covers the point "b" of the FoV}
C = {v ∈ N(v) : v covers the point "c" of the FoV}
G = {v ∈ N(v) : v covers the point "g" of the FoV}



PG={P∩G}
BG={B∩G}
CG={C∩G}
Co(v)=PG×BG×CG

Large Angle of View



Co(V)= {
{V },
{V_1, V_4, V_6},
{V_4, V_5, V_6}
}



Small Angle of View

$Co(V) = \{V\}$



$Co(V) = \{$
$\{V\},$
$\{V_1, V_3, V_4\},$
$\{V_2, V_3, V_4\},$
$\{V_3, V_4, V_5\},$
$\{V_1, V_4, V_6\},$
$\{V_2, V_4, V_6\},$
$\{V_4, V_5, V_6\}$
$\}$



$PG=\{P \cap G_P\}$
$BG=\{B \cap G_V\}$
$CG=\{C \cap G_V\}$
$Co(V)=PG \times BG \times CG$

Heterogeneous AoV



Risk-based scheduling

- Static risk-based scheduling
  - r°=Cte in [0,1]
- Dynamic risk-based scheduling
  - Starts with a low value for r° (0.1)
  - On intrusion, alert neighborhood and increases r° to a r_{max} value (0.9)
  - Stays at r_{max} for T_A seconds before going back to r°
- Dynamic with reinforcement
  - Same as dynamic but several alerts are needed to get to r°= r_{max}
  - Going back to r° is done in one step

Percentage of coverage, active nodes (1)



r^0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
0	.01	.02	.05	0.1	.17	.26	.38	.54	.75	1.1	1.5	3
.2	.07	.15	.25	.37	.51	.67	.86	1.1	1.4	1.7	2.2	3
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.8	.75	1.2	1.6	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.9	3
1	1.5	1.9	2.2	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.9	2	3

2900s

Percentage of coverage, active nodes (2)



In comparison, using a dynamic risk-based scheduling gives a network lifetime of nearly 2900s for r°=0.2

MEAN STEALTH TIME

T_1-T_O IS THE INTRUDER'S
STEALTH TIME
VELOCITY IS SET TO 5M/S



INTRUSIONS STARTS AT T=10S
WHEN AN INTRUDER IS SEEN, COMPUTE THE STEALTH TIME, AND STARTS A NEW INTRUSION UNTIL END OF SIMULATION

MEAN STEALTH TIME





STEALTH TIME, WINAVG[10]





STEALTH TIME, WINAVG[10]



Dynamic scheduling

- ❑ $r° = 0.1$, $r_{MAX} = 0.9$, $T_A = 5, 10, 15, 20..60s$



Dynamic with reinforcement (1)

- $R° = 0.1 \rightarrow I_R = 0.6 \rightarrow R_{MAX} = 0.9$
- 2 alert msg to have $I_R = I_R + 0.1$



Dynamic with reinforcement (2)

- $r^{\circ}=0.1 \rightarrow I_R=0.4/0.5/0.6 \rightarrow r_{MAX}=0.9$
- 2 alert msg to have $I_R=I_R+0.1$



The advantage of having more cover-set (1)

N=6
$P_2(6,6)$

r^0 \ $\lvert Co(v)\rvert$	1	2	3	4	5	6
0.0	0.05	0.20	0.51	1.07	2.10	6.00
0.2	0.30	0.73	1.34	2.20	3.52	6.00
0.5	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	6.00
0.8	2.48	3.80	4.66	5.27	5.70	6.00
1.0	3.90	4.93	5.49	5.80	5.95	6.00

N=12
$P_2(12,3)$

r^0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
0	.01	.02	.05	0.1	.17	.26	.38	.54	.75	1.1	1.5	3
.2	.07	.15	.25	.37	.51	.67	.86	1.1	1.4	1.7	2.2	3
.4	.17	.35	.55	.75	.97	1.2	1.4	1.7	2.0	2.3	2.6	3
.6	.36	.69	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.8	2.0	2.2	2.4	2.6	2.8	3
.8	.75	1.2	1.6	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.9	3
1	1.5	1.9	2.2	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.9	2	3

Occlusions/ Disambiguation

8m.4m rectangle→grouped intrusions



Multiple viewpoints are desirable
Some cover-sets « see » more points than other

The advantage of having more cover-set (2)



Intrusion starts at t=10s
Velocity of 5m/s
Scan line (left to right)
COVwaGbc

Stealth time with grouped intrusions



Defining sentry nodes

● Sentry node: node with high speed capture (high cover set).

○ Idle node: node with low speed capture.



# of cover sets



Sentry nodes



Conclusions

- Surveillance applications have a high level of criticity which make accountability important
- Criticality model with adaptive scheduling of nodes
- Optimize the resource usage by dynamically adjusting the provided service level
- Extension for risk-based scheduling in intrusion detection systems

Hardware & tools

Berkeley Motes

- Each Mote has two separate boards
  - A main CPU board with radio communication circuitry
  - A secondary board with sensing circuitry
- Decouples sensing hardware from communication hardware
- Allows for customization since application specific sensor hardware can be plugged-on to the main board


MICA2


Imote2


MICAz


Sensing boards

iMote2



- ATmega1281 microcontroller
- 128K RAM & 2G SD card.
- 2.4GHz IEEE 802.15.4 compatible. RF and GSM/GPRS







WaspMote (1)







WaspMote (2)

Waspmote & Meshlium







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